Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application and by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-26-2012 
Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application and 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application and" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 609. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/609 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         
      PRECEDENTIAL  
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________ 
 
No. 11-2896 
_________ 
 
 
CONTROL SCREENING LLC 
 
v. 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL APPLICATION AND PRODUCTION  
COMPANY (TECAPRO), HCMC-VIETNAM, 
Appellant 
 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cv-00491) 
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg  
_______ 
 
Argued May 7, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, 
District Judge
*
 
 
(Opinion filed: July 26, 2012) 
_______ 
 
                                              
*
 Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  Judge Pollak died on 
May 8, 2012; this opinion is filed by a quorum of the court.  
28 U.S.C. § 46 and Third Circuit IOP 12.1(b). 
 
2 
 
Lauren E. Komsa  (Argued) 
Anthony J. Pruzinsky 
Hill Rivkins 
New York, NY  10006 
 
 Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Donald P. Jacobs   (Argued) 
Budd Larner 
Short Hills, NJ  07078 
 
 Attorney for Appellee 
_______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This dispute involves New Jersey-based Control 
Screening, LLC and Vietnam-based Technological 
Application and Production Company, HCMC-Vietnam 
(“Tecapro”).  Control Screening and Tecapro disagree about 
the proper interpretation of an arbitration forum selection 
clause in their contract.  The District Court granted Control 
Screening‟s motion and petition to compel arbitration in New 
Jersey, and Tecapro appealed.   
 
I. 
 
Control Screening manufactures and sells X-ray and 
metal detection devices for use in public facilities around the 
world.  Tecapro is a private, state-owned company that was 
formed by the Vietnamese government for the purpose of 
introducing advanced technologies into the Vietnamese 
market.   
 
In April 2010, Tecapro entered into a contract with 
Control Screening for the purchase of twenty-eight 
customized AutoClear X-ray machines with a total purchase 
price of $1,021,156.  Each party now alleges that the other 
party has breached its obligations under the contract.  The 
contract provides that:  
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In the event all disputes are not resolved, the disputes 
shall be settled at International Arbitration Center of 
European countries for claim in the suing party‟s 
country under the rule of the Center.  Decision of 
arbitration shall be final and binding [sic] both parties. 
App. at 51.  Tecapro initiated arbitration proceedings in 
Belgium under the Belgian Judicial Code in November 2010.  
In December 2010, Control Screening notified Tecapro of its 
intention to commence arbitration proceedings in New Jersey.   
 
In January 2011, Control Screening filed its petition to 
compel arbitration in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  The petition requested that the 
District Court compel arbitration of all disputed issues in New 
Jersey, appoint an arbitrator named by Control Screening, 
designate arbitration rules chosen by Control Screening, 
enjoin Tecapro from proceeding with arbitration in Belgium, 
and award attorney‟s fees and costs to Control Screening.  
Tecapro opposed the petition, arguing that the contract 
provided for arbitration in Europe and that, in any event, the 
District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it.   
 
 The District Court determined that it had subject 
matter jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(“New York Convention”), Sept. 30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 
and that it had personal jurisdiction over Tecapro because, 
inter alia, the company had “sufficient contacts with New 
Jersey that relate to and arise out of the 2010 contract.”  App. 
at 6 n.7. 
 
The Court concluded that “the only reasonable 
interpretation of the arbitration clause is that Tecapro could 
have sought to arbitrate in Vietnam and Control Screening in 
New Jersey.  The latter is what happened in this case and 
therefore the arbitration shall proceed in New Jersey.”  App. 
at 6 n.8.  The District Court therefore granted Control 
Screening‟s request to compel arbitration.  Tecapro appeals. 
 
II. 
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 Section 16(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., provides that “[a]n appeal may 
be taken from . . . a final decision with respect to an 
arbitration that is subject to this title.”  Where, as here, “the 
District Court has ordered the parties to proceed to 
arbitration, and dismissed all the claims before it, that 
decision is „final‟ within the meaning of § 16(a)(3), and 
therefore appealable.”  Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000).  Accordingly, under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, this court has jurisdiction to hear Tecapro‟s 
appeal. 
 
 We review a district court‟s decision with respect to 
personal jurisdiction de novo but review factual findings 
made in the course of determining personal jurisdiction for 
clear error.  See Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 
F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review questions 
concerning the applicability and scope of an arbitration 
agreement de novo.  See Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587 
F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 
“A district court decides a motion to compel 
arbitration under the same standard it applies to a motion for 
summary judgment.”  Id.  “The party opposing arbitration is 
given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences that 
may arise.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
   
III. 
 
 Tecapro argues that the District Court erred by:  (1) 
improperly exercising personal jurisdiction over it; (2) failing 
to consider Tecapro‟s facts and evidence; (3) placing the 
burden of proof on Tecapro rather than Control Screening; (4) 
refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing; and (5) finding that 
the parties had agreed to arbitrate in New Jersey rather than in 
Europe. 
 
A. Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Under New Jersey‟s analog to a long-arm statute, N.J. 
Court Rule 4:4-4, a district court may assert personal 
jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent permitted by the 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
Telcordia Tech, 458 F.3d at 177.  A district court may 
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident so long 
as the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the 
forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[T]he plaintiff bears 
the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.”  Carteret Sav. 
Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.  
“Specific jurisdiction is established when a non-resident 
defendant has „purposefully directed‟ his activities at a 
resident of the forum and the injury arises from or is related 
to those activities.”1  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 
144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).  In a contract case, 
such as this one, Control Screening must establish that 
Tecapro‟s contacts with the forum were instrumental in either 
the formation or the breach of the contract.  Gen. Elec. Co., 
270 F.3d at 150. 
 
The relationship between Tecapro and Control 
Screening began in 2006 when Tecapro submitted a purchase 
order to Control Screening.  Vu Khac Tien, then Vice 
Director of Tecapro, wrote to Control Screening President 
and CEO Brad Conway “that this will be the first purchase of 
many . . . .”  App. at 303.  Vu Khac Tien continued: Tecapro 
had “devoted six months of effort and expense to promoting 
Control Screening and AutoClear scanners . . . helping to 
establish your products in our markets.”  Id.  Vu Khac Tien 
also noted that Tecapro had sent one of its employees to a 
Control Screening factory in New Jersey for training.  In 
closing, Vu Khac Tien stated that Tecapro representatives 
were “willing to come to New Jersey ASAP if more 
discussion is needed.”  App. at 307. 
 
                                              
1 Because we find there is specific jurisdiction, we 
need not discuss general jurisdiction. 
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Only a few months later, Tecapro submitted a second 
purchase order to Control Screening.  Then, in August 2007, 
Vu Khac Tien informed Control Screening that Tecapro 
intended to make yet another purchase.  Tecapro also ordered 
individual scanner parts and upgrades from Control Screening 
in New Jersey on multiple occasions.  The relationship 
between Tecapro and Control Screening flourished until 
Tecapro, at its request, became the exclusive distributor of 
Control Screening products in Vietnam in 2009.  
 
In April 2010, Tecapro and Control Screening entered 
into the contract at issue here.  The contract was signed by 
Conway in New Jersey.  Tecapro‟s application for an 
irrevocable letter of credit in connection with the April 2010 
contract named as payment beneficiary “Control Screening 
LLC, 2 Gardner Road Fairfield, New Jersey.”  App. at 335.  
Additionally, several of the X-ray scanner components were 
shipped from Control Screening‟s products department in 
New Jersey.  Finally, Vu Khac Tien sent at least eleven e-
mails regarding the April 2010 contract to Conway or Control 
Screening Vice President Ken Voigtland, both of whose 
offices were located in New Jersey.
2
   
 
Tecapro relies on this court‟s decision in Vetrotex 
Certainteed Corp. v. Consolidated Fiber Glass Products Co., 
75 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1995), to argue that “specific jurisdiction 
cannot be asserted over a commercial buyer that has only 
tangential contact with the seller in the seller‟s state.”  
Appellant‟s Br. at 18.  In Vetrotex, however, the only contacts 
between the defendant and the forum state were “some 
telephone calls and letters.”  75 F.3d at 152.  Furthermore, the 
court in Vetrotex did not consider the parties‟ prior dealings 
in its specific jurisdiction analysis because thirteen months 
had passed between the termination of the parties‟ previous 
business relationship and the beginning of the new 
                                              
2
 The District Court found that in 2010 there were “at 
least 50 emails sent back and forth between Tecapro and 
Control Screening in New Jersey.”  App. at 6 n.7.  We focus 
here on the eleven of those fifty e-mails sent directly from 
Tecapro‟s Vice Director Vu Khac Tien to two of Control 
Screening‟s New Jersey-based executives, Conway and 
Voigtland. 
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relationship at issue in that case, and because that previous 
relationship had been expressly terminated.  Id. at 153. 
 
Here, by contrast, Tecapro‟s contacts with New Jersey 
were not limited to communications such as “emails, fax and 
skype,” App. at 6 n.7, but included the manufacture and 
assembly of major scanner components as well as the design 
of scanner software, all in New Jersey.  See App. at 317.  
Additionally, the April 2010 contract marked the continuation 
of an uninterrupted four year business relationship between 
Tecapro and Control Screening, culminating in Tecapro 
becoming the exclusive distributor of Control Screening 
products in Vietnam.  “It is these factors – prior negotiations 
and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms 
of the contract and the parties‟ actual course of dealing – that 
must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant 
purposefully established minimum contacts within the 
forum.”  Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 479. 
 
There is ample evidence in this record that Tecapro 
purposefully directed its activities at New Jersey, and that 
virtually all of those activities arose from or related to the 
contract between the parties.  Moreover, the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over Tecapro is neither unfair nor 
unjust.
3
  Thus, we conclude that the District Court correctly 
determined that Tecapro‟s activities in New Jersey adequately 
supported a finding of specific jurisdiction.
4
  See World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).   
                                              
3
 Tecapro argues that the “District Court abused its 
discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing.”  
Appellant‟s Br. at 31 (emphasis removed).  Tecapro, 
however, cites no authority that would have required the 
District Court to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on 
the petition nor did Tecapro even request a hearing.  The 
District Court cannot have abused its discretion for “refusing” 
to do something that it was not required to do and that 
Tecapro never requested. 
 
4
 The District Court did not specify the burden of proof 
employed in its personal jurisdiction analysis.  In a case such 
as this one, where the defendant has raised the issue of 
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove, by a 
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B. Arbitration Forum 
 
The parties agree that their contract dispute should be 
arbitrated but do not agree on where arbitration should take 
place.  The arbitration clause at issue provides in relevant part 
that “disputes shall be settled at International Arbitration 
Center of European countries for claim in the suing party‟s 
country under the rule of the Center.”  App. at 51.  The 
“International Arbitration Center of European countries” does 
not exist.  The central question in this case, therefore, is how 
to interpret this clause in order to determine the appropriate 
arbitration forum. 
 
In 1958, the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council adopted the New York Convention.  In 1970, the 
United States acceded to the treaty, and Congress passed 
Chapter 2 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 201-208, implementing the 
Convention.  The Convention requires contracting states to 
recognize written arbitration agreements concerning subject 
matter capable of arbitration.  See Art. II(1).  The United 
States, where Control Screening is a citizen, is a signatory to 
the Convention as is Vietnam, where Tecapro is a citizen. 
 
 Section 201 of the FAA provides that the Convention 
shall be enforced in United States courts.  See 9 U.S.C. § 201.  
Chapter 2 of the FAA creates two causes of action in federal 
court:  (1) an action to compel arbitration in accord with the 
terms of the arbitration agreement, see 9 U.S.C. § 206, and 
(2) an action to confirm an arbitral award made pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement, see 9 U.S.C. § 207.  Article II(3) of the 
New York Convention contains the “null and void” defense 
which is available in actions to “refer the parties to 
arbitration”: 
 
                                                                                                     
preponderance of the evidence, that the district court has the 
authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  
See Carteret Sav. Bank, 954 F.2d at 146.  This court will 
affirm the District Court‟s personal jurisdiction determination 
because Control Screening‟s evidence is sufficient to 
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the District 
Court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Tecapro. 
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The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an 
action in a matter in respect of which the parties have 
made an agreement within the meaning of this article, 
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the 
parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed.    
  
Art. II(3). 
 
“[A]n agreement to arbitrate is „null and void‟ only (1) 
when it is subject to an internationally recognized defense 
such as duress, mistake, fraud, or waiver, or (2) when it 
contravenes fundamental policies of the forum state.”  Rhone 
Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni E 
Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(citation omitted) (interpreting Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention).  However, “[t]he „null and void‟ language must 
be read narrowly, for the signatory nations have jointly 
declared a general policy of enforceability of agreements to 
arbitrate.”  Id. 
 
In this case, the parties mistakenly provided that 
disputes were to be settled at “International Arbitration 
Center of European countries,” which is non-existent.  “At” is 
a preposition defined, in part, as “presence or occurrence in a 
particular place.”  See Webster‟s Third New International 
Dictionary Unabridged 136 (1993).  Thus, the parties agreed 
to arbitrate in a particular place – namely the “International 
Arbitration Center of European countries” – that does not 
exist; a result that could have come about only through 
mistake.
5
 
                                              
5
 Both the District Court and Control Screening 
conclude that the phrase “for claim in the suing party‟s 
country” can only reasonably be interpreted as authorizing 
arbitration in the suing party‟s country.  When read in 
isolation, that language is susceptible to such an 
interpretation.  However, when read in the context of the 
arbitration clause as a whole, the District Court‟s 
interpretation is in direct conflict with the preceding language 
– “the disputes shall be settled at International Arbitration 
Center of European countries.”  Furthermore, the record 
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Since the parties mistakenly designated an arbitration 
forum that does not exist, the forum selection provision of the 
arbitration agreement is “null and void” under Article II(3).  
See Rosgoscirc v. Circus Show Corp., No. 92-Civ.-8498, 
1993 WL 277333, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1993) 
(invalidating an arbitration forum selection provision as “null 
and void” under Article II(3) of the New York Convention 
where the parties agreed to arbitrate at “the International 
Arbitration in the Hague (the Netherlands),” a non-existent 
entity).  Even though the forum selection portion of the 
arbitration clause is “null and void,” there is sufficient 
indication elsewhere in the contract of the parties‟ intent to 
arbitrate, meaning that the parties‟ agreement to arbitrate 
remains in force.  See, e.g., Great Earth Cos., Inc. v. Simons, 
288 F.3d 878, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The validity of the 
arbitration agreement, therefore, turns on whether the 
agreement to arbitrate all disputes was separate and severable 
from the [invalid] forum selection clause.”).  Section 11.0 of 
the contract is entitled “ARBITRATION.”  App. at 50.  The 
second sentence of Section 11.2 of the contract states that:  
“Decision of arbitration shall be final and binding [sic] both 
parties.”  App. at 51.  Finally, Section 11.3 of the contract 
provides that the losing party shall bear “[a]ll expenses in 
connection with the arbitration.”  Id.  Furthermore, both 
parties have expressed a willingness to arbitrate their dispute 
notwithstanding the uncertain meaning of the forum selection 
provision.  Thus, we find that the invalid forum selection 
provision is severable from the rest of the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
                                                                                                     
indicates that both parties understood that arbitration would 
take place in Europe.  For instance, in an email to Vu Khac 
Tien, Control Screening President and CEO Brad Conway 
stated:  “We remain patient as always, and awaiting your 
choice from among the above not-so-bad alternatives to get 
this long delayed and thin-margin deal completed, or to move 
on we suppose to elaborate, costly and unfortunate dispute 
resolution ultimately in Western Europe.”  App. at 720.  
Though the parties apparently intended to arbitrate in Europe, 
those intentions were nullified by virtue of their mutual 
mistake in selecting a non-existent arbitration forum. 
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Because the forum selection provision is “null and 
void,” the otherwise valid arbitration agreement is treated as 
if it does not select a forum.  Under Section 206 of the FAA, 
a district court is empowered to “direct that arbitration be 
held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein 
provided for, whether that place is within or without the 
United States.”  9 U.S.C. § 206.  To the extent that it does not 
conflict with Chapter 2, Chapter 1 of the FAA applies to 
international arbitration agreements.  See 9 U.S.C. § 208.  
Section 4 of Chapter 1 provides that the arbitration hearings 
and proceedings “shall be within the district in which the 
petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed.”6  9 
U.S.C. § 4; see also Econo-Car Int’l, Inc. v. Antilles Car 
Rentals, Inc., 499 F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d Cir. 1974) (Section 4‟s 
“requirement that arbitration take place in the district court 
where the petition is filed is clear and unequivocal”). 
 
Thus, when an arbitration agreement lacks a term 
specifying location, a district court may compel arbitration 
only within its district.  See Jain, 51 F.3d at 690-91 (holding 
that a district court has the power to compel arbitration in the 
                                              
6
 In PaineWebber Inc. v. Faragalli, this court held that 
an action to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA 
“accrues only when the respondent unequivocally refuses to 
arbitrate.”  61 F.3d 1063, 1066 (3d Cir. 1995) (interpreting 
Section 4‟s language that “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged 
failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a 
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United 
States district court . . . for an order directing that such 
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such 
agreement”).  That threshold requirement, however, has only 
been applied by this court, and by other courts of appeal 
applying similar requirements, to domestic arbitration 
agreements.  A district court‟s primary authority to compel 
arbitration in the international context comes from 9 U.S.C. § 
206, rather than from 9 U.S.C. § 4.  PaineWebber‟s threshold 
requirement, therefore, does not apply to international 
arbitration agreements governed by the New York 
Convention.  Cf. Jain v. de Méré,, 51 F.3d 686, 691 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“[W]hile the provision of § 4 allowing a court to order 
arbitration in its own district should apply to an action under 
chapter 2 [of the FAA], its jurisdictional limits should not.”). 
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district where suit was brought where the international 
agreement failed to specify an arbitration forum); see also 
Bauhinia Corp. v. China Nat’l Mach. & Equip. Imp. & Exp. 
Corp., 819 F.2d 247, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).  Because 
the District Court here compelled arbitration within its own 
district (even though it based its decision on other grounds), 
this court will affirm the District Court‟s Order.  See Nicini v. 
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We may affirm 
the District Court on any grounds supported by the record.”). 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court compelling arbitration to proceed in New 
Jersey. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
